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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This dissertation is a compilation of two essays addressing the effects of 
economic factors on the quality of care in U.S. nursing homes. Both papers make used of 
nationally representative data for 2010 on nursing homes in the U.S., state regulation of 
long-term care providers, particularly Medicaid policy towards nursing homes, the 
economic structure of local markets in which the facilities operate, including the extent of 
competition from other long-term care providers, such as assisted living facilities and 
home healthcare agencies, and county-level population demographic characteristics.   
Over the last 20 years nursing homes in many markets across the U.S. have 
experienced increased competition from home health agencies and assisted living 
facilities, yet little is known about how these more recent sources of competition affect 
the quality of care they provide.  The first essay examines how nine different measures of 
nursing home care quality respond to the greater levels of local market competition from 
these alternative providers of long-term care, as well as other nursing homes. The 
findings from this empirical analysis reveal that faced with greater competition from 
assisted living facilities, nursing homes are left to care for more disabled, less healthy 
patients. Although the nursing home’s staff-to-bed ratios rises in response, significant 
declines occur in other measures of care quality, such as more process- and outcome-
based measures.  Competition from home health agencies likewise has mixed effects on 
the nursing home’s care quality, and competition from other nursing homes in a market 
tends to decrease care quality.  These finding suggest that care quality in nursing homes 
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may continue to erode as the market for alternative, community-based long-term care 
services expands. 
The second essay examines the important effects of state Medicaid regulations on 
nursing home care quality. Unlike earlier studies on the effects of Medicaid, this analysis 
adopts a richer model specification for care quality that controls for the economic 
structure of the nursing home’s local market, as well as how the state regulates assisted 
living facilities, who compete with nursing homes for residents. Most previous studies of 
the effects of state Medicaid policies on care quality analyzed nursing homes in isolation, 
ignoring the presence of nearby competitor firms, and how state regulation of assisted 
living facilities might also affect care quality in nursing homes. The findings from the 
analysis reveal that a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate leads to significant 
improvements in nine distinct aspects of nursing home quality, while state certificate-of-
need programs for nursing homes lead to significant declines in several (but not all) 
dimensions of care quality.  A large presence of assisted living beds in a local market also 
tends to reduce nursing home quality, and state regulations regarding assisted living 
facilities indirectly affect nursing home care quality by altering the nature of local market 
competition.  Overall, these results suggest that state laws related to all long-term care 
providers, not just nursing homes, are important determinants of nursing home care 
quality. 
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Chapter 2 
Effects of Long-term Care Market Competition 
on Nursing Home Quality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Long-term care encompasses a broad range of services, including medical and 
non-medical care provided to people who need assistance performing activities of daily 
living.  Current estimates suggest that at least 70 percent of individuals over age 65 will 
need long-term care services at some point in their lifetime (CMS 2014). In 2010, total 
spending for long-term care services was $207.9 billion, or 8 percent of all U.S. personal 
health care spending (O’Shaughnessy 2011), most of which is paid by state Medicaid 
programs.  
Historically, nursing homes have been the major providers of long-term care to 
older adults. In recent decades, however, alternatives to nursing homes have emerged in 
many areas, such as assisted living facilities and home health care providers. Some states 
have even begun to cover care in these alternative settings under Medicaid, by established 
Medicaid 1915(C) waiver programs. With these changes in the structure of the market for 
long-term care, and changes in Medicaid policy in some states, the overall demand for 
nursing home care in the U.S. is also changing. More and more seniors are shifting away 
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from receiving care in a nursing home to receiving home and community-based assisted 
living care instead. 
Assisted living facilities are community-based residential long term care centers 
that provide housing and supportive services for older adults. Since 1990 the total number 
of beds in assisted living facilities has grown rapidly. Nationwide the number of beds 
more than doubled between 1990 and 2002 (Harrington et al 2001), and since then they 
have continued to grow steadily.  As of 2010 there were 51,367 licensed assisted living 
facilities in the U.S. with a total bed capacity of 1,233,690 beds.  Much different from the 
earliest form, assisted living facilities are able to provide more professional medical care 
and more services to assist activities of daily living. They are closer substitutes for 
nursing home services than before.  
Recent research suggests that many older adults have moved out from nursing 
homes into assisted living facilities in order to achieve greater independence and more 
dignity (Perkins et al 2012). There are now 1.8 million adults who live in this nation's 
16,000 nursing homes (Kaye et al 2010), and more than 735,000 adults who live in 
assisted living facilities (NSAL 2012). With their rapid growth rate, assisted living 
facilities are expected to eventually surpass nursing homes to become the major providers 
of long-term care services in the U.S.. 
Home care providers, which supply long-term care services at a patient’s home, 
are also an important substitute for nursing home care. Studies have consistently found 
that most older adults strongly prefer staying in their own home to any other alternative 
(Gibson et al 2003). 
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Despite the growing importance of home and community based services in long-
term care, few studies have looked at whether and how home care providers and assisted 
living facilities are affecting nursing homes. This is surprising because economics 
suggests that nursing homes likely compete not only with other nursing homes, they 
compete with other types of firms that provide alternatives to institutional care.  This 
implies that when a nursing home chooses care quality for its residents, for example, the 
structure of the market in which it operates may be influencing its choices. With all the 
competitive forces now shaping the long-term care market, we should not be examining 
nursing homes in isolation from the rest of the market.  If market competition is having 
effects on nursing homes, then ignoring these effects could lead to biased results and 
false conclusions.  
This study examines how competition from nearby assisted living facilities and 
home care providers affects the quality of care provided by nursing homes. Unlike the 
few previous studies that addressed interactions between assisted living facilities and 
nursing homes using state-specific data sets, this study analyzes data from a large, 
nationwide sample of nursing homes. It is the first paper to study the effects of 
competition from assisted living facilities and home health providers on the quality of 
care within nursing homes. It also examines the effects of state-level regulations and 
policies on nursing homes and assisted living facilities. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides background information on 
the long-term care market and briefly reviews the literature on nursing home quality. 
Section 2 describes the data used for the analysis and the specification of variables, while 
Section 3 describes the statistical methods used. The results are reported in Section 4. 
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Section 5 summarizes the key findings and their policy implications, and describes 
possible future work.  
 
2.2 Background 
With the growing population of older adults and forthcoming wave of baby 
boomers, long-term care has been a heated topic among health economists. Being the 
major provider of long-term care, nursing homes have typically been the center of 
discussion. Early studies, including Chiswick(1975), Scanlon(1980), and Mukamel et 
al(2002), focused on the demand for nursing home services and the price elasticities for 
care, trying to figure out what factors influence the demand function, in order to have a 
clearer view of how this market operates.  Since 2000 researchers have began to focus 
more on nursing home quality, investigating how state regulations and facility 
characteristics influence nursing home quality. Although it is difficult to measure quality 
directly, a whole host of quality measures have been proposed.  Zimmerman et al. (1995) 
suggested quality measures in twelve different domains, discussed their nature and 
characteristics, and examined their validation using a pilot test. On the other side of the 
equation, factors from all sorts of aspects are being used to check their effects on nursing 
home quality. 
Facility characteristics, including for-profit status, have been evaluated by 
Grabowski et al (2003). Their study found that a higher non-profit market share could 
induce a spillover to the for-profit side of the nursing home market and thereby increase 
overall quality in a market. This finding is consistent with a review done by Hillmer et al 
(2005) that found that studies conducted between 1990 and 2002 on the relationship 
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between nursing home for-profit status and quality of care collectively suggest that non-
profit nursing homes provide better quality, measured in many important areas, and the 
quality difference between for-profit and non-profit nursing homes are systematic. 
Harrington et al. (2001) also concluded that investor-owned nursing homes have worse 
residents’ health outcomes than do non-profit homes.  
Another line of literature focused on the effects of Medicaid reimbursement rates 
on nursing home care quality. Cohen and Spector(1996) studied the effects of both the 
reimbursement method and the Medicaid payment rate in their analysis. They found that 
both affect nursing home staffing intensity. With the direct link of staffing intensity to 
nursing home residents’ health outcomes, a higher level of reimbursement rate could 
increase the staffing level that induces a possible quality increase.  
David Grabowski has conducted several studies on the effects of Medicaid 
payment rates. In a 2001 study he found the reimbursement rate had a small positive 
effect on nursing home quality, as measured by the proportion of residents with facility-
acquired pressure sores as well as the number of registered nurses. In another study based 
on longitudinal data, Grabowski (2004) found uniformly positive effects on several 
nursing home quality indicators with an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate. 
This improvement in the strength of the latter analysis is not only attributed to a better 
model setting, but also to the incorporation of the market competition and changes over 
time. In fact, competition in the nursing home sector can be a really important factor that 
influences the interaction between nursing home characteristics and quality outcomes. 
Zinn(1994) uses market share concentration in terms of Herfindahl index to indicate 
8 
 
 
 
competition and finds there are significantly lower prevalence of catheter, restraint use, 
and not toileted in markets with higher concentration.  
Since 1990 there have been significant changes in the long-term care market with 
the emergence of substitutes for nursing home care. More research is needed examining 
the effects of the new market structures. The effect of competition on nursing home 
quality is not as straight forward as the effect of competition on price to see through 
based on economic theories. Morrisey (2001) pointed out two possible circumstances in 
which competition might drive quality into completely different directions. On one hand, 
if quality is related to more services being provided, a lower price caused by competition 
might tend to bring down quality. On the other hand, if competition leads to greater 
efficiency and cost savings, quality might rise. These two opposite possibilities call for 
more evidence based on empirical work. 
To date, only a few studies have considered the effects of assisted living facilities 
on nursing home care quality. Competition from home care agencies has only been 
addressed crudely with home health staff per capita and percentage of women aged15-64 
not in the workforce as proxies. (Zinn 1994). Grunier et al (2007) is one of the few who 
pay attention to assisted living facilities. By mainly looking at the dementia special care 
units in nursing homes, they find that competition from assisted living facilities only 
affected the profile of residents in special care units but not nursing home investment or 
other aspects. Bowblis (2012) checked the effect from both nursing home market 
structure and expansion of assisted living on nursing home quality using data in Ohio 
state. His regression results show that assisted living facilities do have significant, mainly 
negative, effects on nursing home quality. Although this study is only based on data in 
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one state, these effects give a good sketch of the long-term care market interaction in 
Ohio state and suggest a more integrated regulation method for assisted living facilities 
and it also provides strong empirical evidences and supports to include competition from 
other sectors in nursing home quality analysis in the future research.  
The present study is the first to consider how the quality of nursing home care 
responds empirically to local market competition from assisted living facilities, home 
care agencies, as well as other nursing homes. Using nationally representative data from a 
large sample of nursing homes observed in 2010, two questions are examined. First, is 
the quality of care provided by a nursing home influenced by local market competition 
from these three types of firms, and if so, how? Second, is the competition from assisted 
living facility and home care agency taking the form of a battle over price or services? 
 
2.3 Data Sources 
Nursing home-level, county-level, and state-level data from several sources were 
assembled to conduct the analysis. The data sources include the 2010 Certification And 
Survey Provider Enhanced Reports (CASPER), the 2010 Nursing Home Compare (NHC) 
data, the Provider of Services File (POS), the Area Resource File (ARF), the MetLife 
Market Survey of Nursing Homes data, the Assisted Living, Adult Day Services, and 
Home Care Costs (MetLife Market Survey) data, the State Data Book on Long Term 
Care (State Data Book), the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (AL Regulatory 
Review), and assisted living facility supply data collected by Stevenson and Grawboski 
(2010).  
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The facility level nursing home data are from the CASPER and NHC data sets. 
The CASPER data set replaced the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) 
System, and is maintained by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
This data set provides comprehensive information for every Medicare or Medicaid 
certified nursing home facility with its operational characteristics and aggregate resident 
information. The CASPER data was merged at the facility-level with the Nursing Home 
Compare data, which provides information on the quality of care at the nursing home, as 
reported by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).   
Because our interest centers on the effects of competition between nursing homes, 
home care agencies, and assisted living facilities, nursing homes that were certified as a 
skilled nursing facility (SNF) only were dropped from the sample of facilities to be 
analyzed. The care provided by SNFs is much more intense nursing care, and it is not a 
substitute for the intermediate-level care provided by home care agencies and assisted 
living facilities. Dropping the SNF-only facilities leads the total number of observations 
to decrease by 9.44%, from 14827 to 13426. Without any further sampling, this data set 
is a near-complete census of all the non-SNF certified nursing homes in the U.S. in 2010. 
Several variables such as the staffing level per bed, the total number of health 
deficiencies, the percentage of empty beds in the county, a Herfindahl index, and case-
mix measurement were all calculated for each facility using the data sets listed above. 
The staffing level was calculated as full-time-equivalent staff per bed, defined as the sum 
of full-time staff, part-time staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons), and 
contract staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons). The percentage of 
empty beds was derived from the difference between the total number of resident and 
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total number of certified nursing home beds for each facility as a percentage of the total 
number of beds, and then averaged at the county level where the nursing home was 
located. The Herfindahl index was calculated at the county-level and is based on each 
facility’s share of beds, defined as the number of beds in that nursing home divided by 
the total number of beds in that facility’s county.  
Data from the Provider of Service file, which provides information on all certified 
health care institutional providers across the U.S., and the assisted living facility supply 
data collected by Stevenson and Grabowski were merged with the nursing home facility 
file based on each nursing home’s zip code. The assisted living data collected by 
Stevenson and Grabowski describes assisted living facilities across the entire U.S., as of 
2007. Before merging their data with the 2010 nursing home file, their variables were 
each adjusted to reflect 2010 levels, based on the aggregate growth rate in assisted living 
facilities, as reported by the AARP report on Assisted Living and Residential Care in the 
States in 2010. Data from the ARF were likewise merged to the nursing home file based 
on the county. Variables from the ARF include county-specific demographic 
characteristics, such as per capita income, race, gender, poverty rate, mortality rate, and 
region identifier.  
The MetLife Market Survey was collected by the MetLife Mature Market 
Institute. It contains daily private-pay price levels for nursing homes, monthly rates for 
assisted living facilities, hourly rates for home health care agencies, and daily prices for 
adult day services. The private rates are mainly at the state-level with some metropolitan 
areas reported as well. Using state-level price information instead of recording it at 
facility level could help avoid the endogeneity problem between price and quality, thus 
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the state average private price levels were merged with the other previous mentioned data 
sets to provide private-pay rates for each long-term care facility. 
Data on state regulations covering long-term care facilities were also added to the 
nursing home file. Most of the variables describing nursing home and assisted living 
facility regulation take the form of (0,1) indicators. These variables were derived from 
information reported in the State Data Book on Long Term Care (2007) Program and 
Market Characteristics (funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development) and the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (2007) (prepared by the 
National Center for Assisted Living).  
According to the State Date Book on Long Term Care, there are four types of 
rate-setting systems for nursing homes, including prospectively set, flat rate, case-mix 
based, and combination-type systems. The strictest is a flat rate system because it sets a 
uniform level of reimbursement for the same class of homes, regardless of their variation 
in costs. In contrast, a case-mix based system adjusts a nursing home’s rate based on its 
residents’ case-mix which reflects differences in need. Under a prospective rate system a 
nursing home’s reimbursement rate is set in advance, based on the previous costs level of 
each facility, but it doesn’t account for the actual costs. A combination system has both 
prospective and retrospective elements to how rates are set, so that interim rates 
eventually align closer to actual costs. Since only one state has a flat rate system and one 
state has a case-mix based system, this analysis could control for only the prospective and 
combination systems in the regression models estimated. 
State rate-setting systems for assisted living facilities can be categorized into five 
approaches: flat rate, tiered rate, case-mix based rate, fee-for-service (FFS) rate, and 
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negotiated rate systems. A flat rate system for assisted living facilities, just like a flat rate 
system for nursing homes, does not allow any adjustments for conditional differences 
across assisted living facilities. Rather, each facility receives the same flat rate. A case-
mix based system has the same basic logic as a case-mix reimbursement system for 
nursing homes. A tiered rate system is quite similar to a case-mix based system, except it 
typically has fewer rate categories than a case-mix based system. Under a fee-for-service 
rate setting scheme, instead of receiving a monthly payment, the assisted living facility 
has to send bill to the payment agency based on the services delivered to the resident. 
Finally, a negotiated rate system is a method that combines some or all of the other four 
systems. Table 2.1 describes all of the variables used in the analysis and their sources. 
 
2.4 Empirical Specification of Variables 
2.4.1 Quality Measures 
Quality is a multidimensional concept. Measures of it fall into three categories: 
structural measures, process-of-care measures, and outcome measures. Structural 
measures are organizational characteristics of nursing homes, and include staffing levels 
as well as the scope of the nursing home’s health-related deficiencies, such as the number 
of federal minimum quality standards the facility fails to fulfill. Process measures include 
the prevalence of indwelling catheters in the nursing home, the prevalence of tube 
feeding, the prevalence of physical restraints, and the facility’s drug error rate. In general, 
process measures depend on and reflect the interactions that are occurring between the 
nursing home staff and its patients. Outcome measures, such as the prevalence of 
pressure sores in the nursing home, are widely regarded as the most straight forward 
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measures of care quality. Outcome measures represent changes in resident characteristics 
that are directly attributable to the practice and environment of the nursing home.  
In this paper measures from all three categories are used. Table 2.2 lists the nine 
variables in the analysis that measure quality and their type. Although registered nurses 
(RN) per bed, licensed practical nurses (LPN) per bed, and nurse aids per bed are all 
measures of staffing levels, they should not be regarded as perfect substitutes. RNs 
usually have more medical skills and can provide more intensive and skilled services to a 
resident. LPNs focus more on daily medical routines that help preserve a resident’s well 
being. The all-day-round care provided by nurse aids can possibly affect a resident’s 
satisfaction and his/her mood. To acknowledge these differences in roles, all three are 
used as quality indicators in the analysis. Measurements of catheter and pressure sores are 
adjusted for pre-existing conditions where the prevalence is recorded as percentage of 
residents who did not have but acquired catheter or pressure sore during the stay in 
nursing home facilities.  
2.4.2 Case Mix Measures 
The analysis controls for the case mix of residents in order to ensure that the 
quality indicators for each nursing home facility are not biased by case-mix differences. 
A case-mix index was created to measure the level of sickness among residents in each 
facility, and it was included in all nursing home quality regressions. The nursing home 
case-mix index was built based on the "Management Minutes System" designed by Bill 
Thoms (1975). It is expressed in minutes of staff time where different prevalence of 
disability is given a different weight based on the level of sickness. The indicators of 
disabilities are mutually exclusive and expressed in term of percentage of residents. In 
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order to avoid multicollinearity in the statistical analysis, any quality indicator that is 
embodied in the case-mix system was abandoned as dependant variables. The formula for 
case-mix index calculation is shown in Appendix A. 
2.4.3 Definition of the Market 
Before local market competition can be measured, the relevant market needs to be 
defined. The market should be a place where competition actually happens. In most 
previous studies of nursing homes the county has been used to represent the local market. 
Although not ideal, it has proven to be reasonable. For example, by looking at resident 
characteristics in different regions, Nyman (1994), Gertler (1989), and Banaszak-Holl et 
al (1996) all found that more than 75% of nursing home residents were from the same 
county where the home they were in was located. Therefore, following Zinn(1994), 
Cohen and Spector (1996), and Grabowski (2001), this study used the county to 
approximate the relevant geographic market. 
2.4.4 Excess Demand  
States control the supply of nursing home beds through their certificate-of-need 
and moratorium regulations.  Limits on nursing home bed supply can lead to unfulfilled 
demand in some markets, a phenomenon economists call "excess demand". When excess 
demand exists, a facility may be able to strategically select residents based on its own 
preferences. Because potential patients differ in terms of their payment rates and 
sometimes health conditions, more profitable private-pay patients are usually admitted 
first. When this happens individuals on Medicaid typically wait in line until an empty bed 
becomes available. In effect, they lose the right to choose a nursing home based on its 
quality, which in turn may reduce the willingness of local nursing homes to provide 
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better quality and to compete with each other based on quality. Different studies have 
reached different conclusions about the effects of excess demand on the quality of 
nursing home care, and about how Medicaid reimbursement affects quality in the 
presence of excess demand (Grabowski 2001, Gertler 1992, Nyman 1989). In this 
analysis, excess demand was measured as the county-wide average percentage of empty 
nursing home beds. 
 
2.5 Econometric Framework  
Using the 2010 data on nursing homes and their markets described above, we 
examined the effects of market competition on nursing home quality by estimating a 
series of linear regression models for the quality measures. In each model estimated, we 
allowed for the possibility that nursing home beds and the structure of the market might 
be endogenous to the facility. Specifically, Hausman tests were first conducted to check 
the endogeneity of nursing home beds, per capita home care agencies, and per capita 
assisted living beds. The results from these tests ruled out the endogeneity of nursing 
home beds and home care agencies per capita, but they failed to reject the endogeneity of 
assisted living beds per capita. To address this issue, two-stage least squares regression 
model were adopted, explicitely treating assisted living beds per capita as endogenous.   
The instrument variables should be correlated with assisted living facility bed 
number but not correlated with nursing home quality indicators. State regulatory factors 
that affect the assisted living industry, such as regulation of facility scope of care, 
reimbursement methods, and whether the state had a Medicaid waiver covering assisted 
living care, are good candidates for instrument variables. However, some other policy 
17 
 
 
 
variables such as assisted living private-pay price level and assisted living certificate-of-
need regulation might be correlated with the nursing home quality indicators as well as 
the variables measuring assisted living facilities. Thus, these variables were left out of the 
first-stage regression and were used as independent variables in the second stage 
regression only.  
2.5.1 Statistical Models 
The basic linear regression model is built as equation (1), where Qim is the 
dependant variable for nursing home quality of nursing home i in market m. Series of 
facility characteristics for nursing home i in market m is are included in Xim. Sm, which is 
the key set of variables in this paper, is composed of market competition from nursing 
homes, assisted living facilities, and home care agencies in market m. Zm represents 
county level demographic characteristics. RmNH are variables for nursing home state 
regulations. 
Qim=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4SmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim   (1) 
Because of the endogeneity of the assisted living beds per capita, the actual 
regression model is regressed in two stages with instrument variables dealing with the 
endogenous variable.  Thus, for the first stage, we have: 
SmAL = β1Xim+ β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4Zm+ β5RmNH+β6RmAL+εm  (2) 
where SmAL is endogenous, and RmAL is a vector of state regulation instruments to identify 
the model. Upon estimating equation (2), the following second stage equation was 
estimated for each quality measure: 
Qim=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4ŜmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim   (3) 
where ŜmAL was the estimated value from equation (2). 
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In order to further examine the possible effects of market competition on variables 
other than quality, two more linear regressions were also estimated. Equation (4) below 
describes the price per day received by the nursing home, and equation (5) below 
describes the case-mix of its residents: 
PmNH=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4SmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim   (4) 
CMimNH=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4SmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim             (5) 
where PmNH measures the nursing home’s daily private-pay price level for market m, and 
CMimNH is the case-mix index for nursing home i in market m. In estimating equations (4) 
and (5) we allowed for possible heteroscedasticity in the standard errors. 
 
2.6 Results 
Table 2.3 reports the mean and standard deviations for all variables used in the 
analysis. 
2.6.1 Effects of Competition on Nursing Home Quality 
Table 2.4 summarizes the key results from the two-stage least squares regressions 
for the nine quality indicators. It reports on the coefficients in these models for variables 
that measure local market competition from nursing homes, home care agencies, and 
assisted living facilities.  Although not reported in the table, each of the models estimated 
also controlled for all the variables shown in the data summary, and the full regressions 
are available from the author upon request. Each column of the table describes a different 
quality measure. 
The first three quality indicators measure staffing per bed, and were computed as 
the number of nursing home professionals per 1000 nursing home beds. The measures 
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were rescaled for the purpose of reporting coefficients. Staffing levels are believed to be 
positively correlated with nursing home quality, i.e., the higher the staffing level per bed, 
the better the nursing home’s quality. The remaining six quality indicators measure 
deficiencies in health care services, care procedures, and health outcomes, and they are 
believed to be negatively related to the quality level of a nursing home. For example, the 
higher the percentage of residents who have facility-acquired pressure sores, the lower 
the nursing home’s quality. Thus, a positive relationship of an independent variable with 
a positive quality indicator suggests an increase in that variable increases quality, 
whereas a positive relationship with a negative quality indicator suggests an increase in 
that independent variable decreases quality. 
Each quality model included four measures of local market competition. 
Competition from assisted living facilities was measured by the number of assisted living 
facility beds per capita in the county. Competition from home care agencies was 
measured by the number of home care agencies per capita in the county.  Competition 
from other nursing homes in the area was measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI) of 
nursing home bed share in each county. The index used in the regression is adjusted by 1 
minus the actual index in order to better ally with the magnitude of competition. After the 
alternation, a higher adjusted HHI value indicates more intense competition among 
nursing homes. Finally, the county-wide average percent of empty nursing home beds is a 
proxy for the presence of excess bed demand in the market.   
The results in Table 2.4 strongly suggest that nursing home quality was affected 
by local competition from home health agencies, assisted living facilities, as well as other 
nursing homes. The coefficients of home care agencies per capita are statistically 
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significant for eight of the quality indicators. Competition from home health agencies, 
however, had mixed effects on quality, tending to reduce nursing staffing levels, while it 
had mostly positive effects on other structure, process and outcome quality measurements. 
Judging from the regression results, competition from home care agencies was mainly 
focused in the labor market where both home care agencies and nursing homes are trying 
to get more professional nursing staff. The marginal effect of one unit increase in the 
home care agency per capita would lead to a decrease of 2.45 RN per bed in nursing 
homes and a 10.33 decrease of nurse aides per nursing home bed. However, the 
competition from home care agencies doesn’t bring down nursing home quality measured 
by number of health deficiencies, percentage physically restrained resident, percentage 
with facility acquired catheters and drug error rate. 
In contrast, Table 2.4 also reveals that competition from assisted living facility 
mainly improves staffing levels in nursing homes, but reduces quality indicated by 
process measurements. This is likely the result of differences in residents’ characteristics 
between these two types of long-term care providers. Residents in assisted living 
facilities tend to be "low-care" patients (Mor et al.2007) who generally have less severe 
medical needs than residents in nursing homes. Morand colleagues found that about 5 to 
12 percent of nursing home residents fall into the category, "low-care". The proportion of 
these residents is higher in states with lower investment in assisted living facilities. This 
suggests that where there is a greater presence of assisted living facilities there will be 
fewer "low-care" patients in nursing homes, leaving nursing homes with residents who 
have higher levels of disabilities. In this case, nursing homes will need higher levels of 
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nursing staff, and the health conditions will be lower for the nursing home residents as 
well.  
The latter part of this explanation is supported by the regression results for the 
process and outcome quality indicators. The number of health deficiencies, the 
percentage of residents physically restrained, the percentage with catheters, and the drug 
error rate are all higher in markets with a high number of assisted living beds per capita. 
These results suggest that when assisted living beds per capita increases by 1, this 
increases the number of health deficiencies in the nursing home by 89.39, the drug error 
rate by 3.72, the percentage of residents who are physically restrained by 7.46, and the 
percentage with catheters by 2.25. However, the health outcome measured by percentage 
of residents with facility acquired pressure sore improves in the presence of greater 
competition from assisted living facilities, e.g., a 1 unit increase in assisted living beds 
per capita decreases the percentage of residents with pressure sores by 4.22. 
This finding of negative competition effects on health deficiencies is consistent 
with recent findings from Bowblis (2012), who studied markets for long-term care in 
Ohio. He found that a one-unit increase in assisted living beds per 100 population could 
increase regulatory deficiencies by 4.60. Coefficients on factors, such as percentage 
physically restrained and percentage with facility acquired catheters that are not 
significant in his analysis using Ohio state data are significant using the national sample 
in this study.  
The coefficients on the HHI measure the effects of competition from other nearby 
nursing homes.  Competition from other nursing homes appears to have positive effect on 
staffing levels, while the effects on resident health outcome are mixed. The results 
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suggest that greater competition from nearby nursing homes decreases the percentage of 
resident with facility-acquired catheters, but at the same time, it increases the percentage 
of patients taking antipsychotic medication or who have pressure sores.  
Bowblis (2012) used nursing home facility per capita as a proxy for nursing 
homes’ within sector competition. Despite the difference in competition proxy, the 
findings about the effects on nursing home resident outcomes are consistent. The drug 
error rate will also increase with nursing home competition, which the study done by 
Bowblis failed to measure.  
Zinn (1994) also includes a HHI to indicate market concentration in his analysis 
of nursing home quality. He finds a higher concentration of nursing homes will decrease 
prevalence of physically restrained, catheterized, and not toileted residents in nursing 
homes. Although percentage not toileted is not included in this study and percentage 
physically restrained is not significant in the result, the conclusion with catheterized 
residents in this study is completely opposite from the one by Zinn. This discrepancy 
might be caused by difference in measuring prevalence of catheter as facility acquired or 
as overall level. It also might be affected by the market changes through time. Zinn’s 
study was based on data from 1987 when home and community based services have not 
thrived, while this study used 2010 data that fully encompasses the effects from assisted 
living and home care sectors. The study done by Grabowski in 2004 using data from 
1991 to 1998 also has some consistent as well as opposite conclusion with our results. 
These differences in the conclusions further support the argument that more recent and 
more comprehensive analyses are needed following the huge change in the long-term 
care market.  
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The county average percentage of empty beds serves as a statistically significant 
and negative explanatory variable for all nine nursing home quality measurements. 
Although it might seem intuitive to think that with higher level of empty beds, nursing 
homes using the same amount of staffing and resource can concentrate on smaller 
number of resident, thus the quality should increase. However, this hypothesis is not 
supported by the empirical results. Actually, based on the excess demand theory, when 
the bed constraint is in effect, nursing homes have the power to choose residents. In this 
case, the homes will most likely choose private payers over Medicaid residents because 
of the higher price. When there is lower demand than supply, nursing homes lose the 
power to discriminate on the payer type. Therefore, there will be higher proportion of 
Medicaid residents in the facilities. Furthermore, as is proven by pervious literature and 
the regression on case-mix in Table 2.6, the disability level for Medicaid residents are 
significantly higher. Research done by Nyman (1988) also shows that the low-quality-
high-Medicaid relationship not only exists, but is much stronger with excess demand. 
Under the influences of both worse health conditions and lower payment rate, higher 
percentage of Medicaid payers will more likely bring down the overall nursing home 
quality measurements. 
2.6.2 Effects of Competition on Nursing Home Private-Pay Price 
Table 2.5 shows how the nursing home private daily average price is influenced 
by market competition. As shown in Table 2.5, competition from home care agencies 
decreases the nursing home private daily price significantly. This result indicates that the 
competition effect from home care agencies to nursing homes is mainly presented in the 
form of price. A study done by Li and Jensen (2011), which analyzes the long-term care 
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usage pattern of long-term care insurance (LTCI) policy holders, shows that LTCI 
holders who have moderate disabilities would prefer to stay at home than entering a 
nursing facility to receive care. This result illustrates that competition from home care 
agencies reduces the demand of nursing home residents who have LTCI. With the price 
difference of a private insurer and a Medicaid patient, this competition reduces the price 
level for nursing homes.  
On the other hand, competition from assisted living facilities and other nursing 
homes both affect nursing home private price positively. However, the magnitudes of 
these effects on price are very small. For example, a 1 unit increase in the per capita 
assisted living bed increases the nursing home price by 5.9, and a 1 point change in the 
nursing home HHI increases the price by 0.93. A positive price effect of competition 
from assisted living facility might stem from a higher disability rate in nursing homes 
when there is higher penetration of assisted living facilities. It might also be a result of 
reverse causality where assisted living facilities grow faster in areas where the price level 
of nursing home services is higher. The positive competition effect on price from other 
nursing homes seems counter-intuitive. However, with some limitations in the data sets, 
nursing homes which are from the same multi-site firm cannot be distinguished from 
others. Although these nursing homes might be considered as independent small firms 
that help intensify competition, they are actually operating under the same regime which 
could reduce competition and increase price.  
The association between the average percentage of empty beds in the county and 
the private-pay price is consistent with economic theory. When demand is lower, price 
will be lower too. Although only the private-pay price of nursing home service is shown 
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in Table 2.5, the competition effects on Medicaid reimbursement rate are similar as the 
private price because of a high correlation (0.6011) between the two price levels. 
2.6.3 Effects of Competition on Nursing Home Case Mix 
Table 2.6 reports how nursing home case-mix index is affected by market 
competition. The more home care agencies per capita in a county, the lower the case-mix 
index of nursing home residents in that county. In other words, competition from home 
care agencies help reduce the case-mix of nursing home residents, leaving nursing homes 
with a healthier group that further lower the burden of providing more services. This may 
be caused by the proportion of post hospital care patients who use home care agency 
mostly for recovery. These patients whose case-mix indexes are much higher are 
generally in need of more nursing care. However, strictly speaking, they should not be 
counted as long-term care patients because they typically need just a relatively short 
period time of health services. Drawing this part of resident out of nursing homes might 
be the reason why number of home care agencies is negatively associated with residents’ 
case-mix in nursing homes. 
Assisted living facilities, on the other hand, provide services to individuals who 
are in less need of care. Competition from assisted living facilities will attract residents 
with better health conditions moving out of nursing homes, thus increases nursing home 
case-mix index. Furthermore, as the study done by Spillman et al (2002), the annual use 
of assisted living residents are much longer than before that about 45 percent of resident 
stayed throughout the year in 1998. This usage pattern implies that the "low-care" users 
stay longer in the assisted living facilities than before. This longer stay will delay the 
timing of entering nursing homes. In that case, when they are actually moved out of 
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assisted livings into nursing homes, their health conditions would be much worse than 
before. With the effects from both resident characteristics and usage patterns, competition 
from assisted living facility increases case-mix index of residents in nursing homes. This 
assumption is supported by the empirical results here. 
Competition from other nursing home shown by the HHI index is positively 
associated with nursing home case-mix. In other words, case-mix in nursing homes 
increases with higher level of competition among nursing homes. For a nursing home that 
operates as a monopoly in a market, it has the full power to choose residents and to set 
price discrimination. Under this circumstance, healthier and better-paying patients tend to 
be admitted, and the ones with worse health conditions are left out. When competition 
becomes more and more severe, however, nursing homes compete for residents by 
broadening their scopes in admitting patients. In this way, patients with more 
complications and who need more resources are more likely to be admitted, thus the case-
mix in nursing homes is higher with more market competition. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
With the rapid growth in home care agencies and assisted living facilities across 
the U.S., nursing homes face new sources of competition for provision of long-term care 
services. This paper is the first to study how local competition from home care agencies 
and assisted living facilities affects care quality in nursing homes, the private-pay prices 
they charge, and the case-mix complexity of their residents. From this nationwide 
analysis of nursing home care quality in 2010, five broad findings emerge.   
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First, nursing home quality is affected by local competition from assisted living 
facilities, home care agencies, and other nursing homes. Overall, these effects are mostly 
statistically significant and intuitive. At the same time, different types of competitors 
have different effects on nursing homes. 
Second, increased competition from home care agencies has mixed effects on 
nursing home quality. Its effects on staff-to-bed ratios were mostly negative, whereas its 
effects on other structure, process, and outcome quality measures were mostly positive. 
We also found evidence that increased competition from home care agencies affects the 
private-pay prices that nursing homes charge. As the supply of local home care providers 
increases, the private-pay price in nursing homes declines. One interpretation is that 
nursing homes are competing with home care providers on the basis of price. 
Third, increased competition from assisted living facilities also has mixed effects. 
Despite some positive effects on staff-to-bed ratios, competition from assisted living 
facility overall tends to lower nursing home quality. This is because having more assisted 
living beds in an area significantly raises the case-mix complexity in the nursing home. 
Since "low-care" residents prefer assisted living facilities, the nursing home’s case-mix 
shifts to a more-disabled, sicker mix of residents. We also presented evidence that the 
private-pay price in the nursing home also rose in order to cover the higher cost of caring 
for this more disabled patient mix. But given a more severe case-mix, care quality tends 
to suffer.  
Fourth, increased competition from other nursing homes had positive effects on 
staff-to-bed ratios, while the effects on resident health outcomes were mixed. 
Competition from other nursing homes decreased the percentage of residents with a 
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facility-acquired catheter, but increased the percentage of patients taking antipsychotics, 
the percentage with pressure sores, and the drug error rate in the facility. 
Fifth, excess demand for nursing home beds in an area has significant negative 
effects on all measures of nursing home quality. A high empty bed rate may be caused by 
lower overall demand, and it might also be the result of competition from home and 
community based services. Under both causes, nursing homes have less power to choose 
their residents. More Medicaid patients and more "high-care" patients may be admitted, 
causing the decrease in nursing home quality.  
Overall, the findings in this paper are broadly consistent with previous research 
on the effects of competition in the market for nursing home care. We found that 
competition from assisted living facilities has mixed effects on care quality in nursing 
homes. Although staff-to-bed ratios rise, other measures of care quality tend to fall, in 
part because of the worsening case-mix of the nursing home’s residents. The effects of 
competition from home care agencies reported here are presented for the first time, and 
so cannot be compared to prior studies. Yet, our findings for this source of competition 
seem reasonable. The effects of competition from other nursing homes reported here are 
differ in some ways from what previous researchers have found. This may be due to 
differences in the time frame across different studies. With the exception of Bowblis 
(2012), most previous work on this issue was based on much older data, when nursing 
homes were the dominant suppliers in markets for long-term care.   
In summary, long-term care provided by nursing homes appears to be evolving in 
response to growing market competition from assisted living facilities and home care 
agencies.  Faced with greater competition from assisted living facilities, nursing homes 
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are left to care for the more disabled and less healthy patients. Although a facility’s 
staffing levels rise in response, other measures of care quality decline, such as more 
process- and outcome-based measures. There are strong indications that the 
transformation of nursing homes and the market for long-term care will continue.  
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Tables for Chapter 2: 
Table 2.1 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition Source 
Quality Measures 
RN/Beds Total number of registered nurses per beds in each nursing 
facility 
CASPER 
LPN/Beds Total number of licensed practical nurses  per beds in each 
nursing facility 
CASPER 
Nurse Aides/Beds Total number of Nurse Aides per beds in each nursing 
facility 
CASPER 
Health Deficiencies  Number of regulatory health deficiencies in each nursing 
facility 
NHC 
Drug Error Rate  Percentage of drug error in each facility CASPER 
Percentage  Physically 
Restrained 
Percentage of resident in each facility who are physically 
restrained 
CASPER 
Percentage  
Antipsychotic 
Percentage of resident in each facility who use antipsychotic 
medication 
CASPER 
Percentage  Acquired 
Catheters 
Percentage of resident in each facility who acquired catheter 
during the stay 
CASPER 
Percentage Acquired 
Pressure Sores 
Percentage of resident in each facility who are acquired 
pressure sore during the stay 
CASPER 
Nursing Home Facility Characteristics 
NH Beds Per Capita Nursing home total beds per capita for each facility CASPER 
NH Ownership Dummy variable if Government owned=1; 0=otherwise CASPER 
For/Non- Profit Dummy variable For-profit=1; Non-profit=0 CASPER 
Provider Based Facility Dummy variable =1 if provider based; 0=otherwise CASPER 
Percentage Medicaid 
Residents 
Percentage of Medicaid residents in each facility CASPER 
Special Care Beds  Percentage of nursing home beds for Alzheimer patients CASPER 
Case-Mix Index Case mix measurement for each facility CASPER 
Market Structure 
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NH Avg Empty Beds Average percentage of nursing home empty beds in county CASPER 
HC Agency Per Capita Number of home care agencies per capita in county POS 
AL Beds Per Capita Number of assisted living beds per capita in county Stevensen 2010 
NH Herfindahl Index  Nursing home Herfindahl Index in each county CASPER 
County Demographic Characteristics 
Census Region Code 1=Northeast 2=Midwest 3=South 4=West ARF 
County Per Capita 
Income 
Per capita income in each county ARF 
Population 65+ Percentage of population age 65 and over in county ARF 
Adult Female Percentage of population adult female in county ARF 
Medicaid Eligible  Percentage of Medicaid eligible older adults in 65 and over 
age group in each county 
ARF 
Mortality Rate County mortality rate ARF 
Poverty Rate County poverty rate ARF 
Percentage White Percentage white population in county  ARF 
Percentage Black Percentage black population in county ARF 
Population Density Population density per square mile in county ARF 
Low Education Type Dummy variable for low educational region ARF 
State Policy Factors 
NH daily Avg Price Nursing home private-pay daily average price MetLife Market 
Survey 
NH Price Ratio Nursing home Medicaid reimbursement rate over nursing 
home private pay price 
MetLife Market 
Survey 
AL Daily Avg Price Assisted living facility private-pay daily average price MetLife Market 
Survey 
HC hourly Avg Price Home health care agency private-pay hourly average price MetLife Market 
Survey 
Adult Day Care Daily 
Avg Price 
Adult day care facility private-pay daily average price MetLife Market 
Survey 
NH CON Dummy variable for state nursing home Certificates of Need 
regulation 
State Data Book 
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NH Prospective 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for prospective reimbursement system State Data Book 
NH Combination 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for combination reimbursement system State Data Book 
NH Case-Mix Adjusters Dummy variable of whether the reimbursement rate is 
adjusted for case-mix 
State Data Book 
AL CON Dummy variable for state assisted living Certificates of 
Need regulation 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Facility Scope of 
Care 
Dummy variable of whether the assisted living facility could 
provide nursing services 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Medicaid Waiver Dummy variable of whether the state Medicaid waiver could 
cover assisted living costs 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL State Plan   Dummy variable of whether there is a state plan to cover 
assisted living costs 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Flat Rate 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for flat rate reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Tiered Rate 
Reimbursement  
Dummy variable for tiered rate reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Case-Mix 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for case-mix reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL FFS Reimbursement Dummy variable for fee-for-service reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Negotiated 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for negotiated reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
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Table 2.2  Type of Quality Indicators   
Quality Indicator Type of Indicator 
RN/Bed Structure 
LPN/Bed Structure 
Nurse Aids/Bed Structure 
Health Deficiency Structure 
Drug Error Rate Process 
Percentage Physically Restrained Process 
Percentage  Antipsychotic Process 
Percentage  Acquire Catheters Process 
Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores Outcome 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics of All Variables 
Total observation number: 13426  
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. 
RN/Beds 0.07169 0.08586 
LPN/Beds 0.135396 0.126905 
Nurse Aides/Beds 0.378815 0.185241 
Health Deficiencies  14.98494 11.32956 
Drug Error Rate  1.504207 4.067297 
Percentage  Physically Restrained 3.11389 5.58665 
Percentage  Antipsychotic 25.19481 14.81464 
Percentage  Acquire Catheters 1.623429 2.80799 
Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores 2.941331 3.245092 
NH Beds Per Capita 0.165465 0.148378 
NH Ownership 0.761367 0.426264 
For/Non- Profit 0.705123 0.456005 
Provider Based Facility 0.048494 0.214816 
Percentage Medicaid Residents 62.89192 19.74553 
Special Care Beds  4.987203 13.21166 
Case-Mix Index 141.9866 43.93583 
NH Avg Empty Beds 17.34904 10.53505 
HC Agency Per Capita 0.036434 0.057068 
AL Beds Per Capita 0.311181 0.221559 
Herfindahl Index (1-HHI) 0.7740254 0.2565023 
Census Region Code 2.461169 0.946563 
County Per Capita Income (in 1000s) 1.722276 0.721113 
Population 65+ 14.08715 3.631144 
Adult Female 30.0873 2.268431 
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Variables  Mean Std. Dev. 
Medicaid eligible  15.28146 7.763679 
Mortality Rate 0.904158 0.23473 
Poverty Rate 15.58205 5.318782 
Percentage White 77.39127 16.67342 
Percentage Black 11.00004 12.85455 
Population Density  (in1000s) 1.244913 4.045115 
Low Education Type 0.121789 0.327054 
NH daily Avg Price 192.0493 58.36996 
NH Price Ratio 132.4298 68.02018 
AL Daily Avg Price 107.2017 19.53959 
HC hourly Avg Price 20.66501 2.799751 
Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price 60.38816 17.47155 
NH CON 0.773915 0.41831 
NH Prospective Reimbursement 0.849497 0.357577 
NH Combination Reimbursement 0.136091 0.342898 
NH Case-Mix Adjusters 0.677738 0.46736 
AL CON 0.156333 0.363184 
AL Facility Scope of Care 0.749871 0.434623 
AL Medicaid Waiver 0.716859 0.450541 
AL State Plan   0.244645 0.487086 
AL Flat Rate Reimbursement 0.312043 0.463347 
AL Tiered Rate Reimbursement  0.432814 0.495487 
AL Case-Mix Reimbursement 0.14892 0.356025 
AL FFS Reimbursement 0.070242 0.255565 
AL Negotiated Reimbursement 0.035982 0.186253 
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Table 2.4  Two-stage Least Square Model on Nine Quality Indicators: 
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Table 2.5 Linear Regression on Nursing Home Daily Average Price 
Nursing Home Daily Average Price  Coef. Std. Err. 
HC Agency  Per Capita -282.378*** (104.318) 
AL Beds Per Capita 5.943*** (2.538) 
NH Herfindahl Index  0.925*** (0.202) 
NH Avg Empty Beds -0.986*** (0.038) 
NH Beds Per Capita 296.548*** (46.124) 
NH Ownership 5.610*** (1.711) 
For/Non- Profit -2.613* (1.583) 
Provider Based Facility 3.914* (2.217) 
Medicaid Residents 0.163*** (0.017) 
Special Care Beds  -0.007 (0.021) 
Case-Mix Index 0.064*** (0.019) 
Census Region Code -13.840*** (0.570) 
County Per Capita Income (in1000s) -2.847*** (0.645) 
Population 65+ 2.553*** (0.190) 
Adult Female 2.056*** (0.181) 
Medicaid eligible  -0.204*** (0.056) 
Mortality Rate -33.054*** (3.007) 
Poverty Rate 0.428*** (0.094) 
Percentage White -0.510*** (0.078) 
Percentage Black -0.746*** (0.076) 
Population Density (in1000s) 0.803*** (0.081) 
Low Education Type 4.510*** (1.071) 
AL Daily Avg Price 1.576*** (0.027) 
HC Hourly Avg Price -0.817*** (0.141) 
Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price 0.185*** (0.023) 
NH CON 23.485*** (1.126) 
AL CON -14.997*** (0.852) 
NH Prospective Reimbursement -47.474*** (1.438) 
NH Combination Reimbursement -50.976*** (1.497) 
NH Case-Mix Adjusters -7.254*** (0.735) 
_cons 64.876*** (10.876) 
Estimated coefficients are reported for each variable and standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at the 90% confidence level   **   significant at the 95% confidence level   ***  significant at 
the 99% confidence level  
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Table 2.6 Linear Regression on Nursing Home Case-mix Index 
NH Case-Mix Index Coef. Std. Err. 
HC Agency  Per Capita -67.600* (38.170) 
AL Beds Per Capita 2.493* (1.510) 
NH Herfindahl Index  0.525*** (0.135) 
NH Avg Empty Beds -0.285*** (0.036) 
NH Beds Per Capita -28.751 (41.364) 
NH Ownership 2.775 (2.106) 
For/Non- Profit -6.475*** (2.204) 
Provider Based Facility -2.477 (2.157) 
Medicaid Residents 0.091* (0.052) 
Special Care Beds  -0.001 (0.020) 
Census Region Code 4.728*** (0.609) 
County Per Capita Income (in1000s) -2.989*** (0.851) 
Population 65+ -0.144 (0.238) 
Adult Female 0.261 (0.240) 
Medicaid eligible  0.254*** (0.076) 
Mortality Rate -7.410** (3.225) 
Poverty Rate -0.295* (0.169) 
Percentage White 0.308*** (0.047) 
Percentage Black 0.418*** (0.053) 
Population Density (in1000s) -0.735*** (0.108) 
Low Education Type 0.100 (1.384) 
Nursing Home Daily Average Price 0.113*** (0.013) 
AL Daily Avg Price -0.007 (0.025) 
HC Hourly Avg Price -1.122*** (0.112) 
Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price -0.086*** (0.020) 
NH CON -4.726*** (0.869) 
AL CON 5.308*** (2.144) 
NH Prospective Reimbursement 4.834*** (1.561) 
NH Combination Reimbursement 5.948*** (2.248) 
NH Case-Mix Adjusters 3.541*** (1.067) 
_cons 110.307*** (10.620) 
 
Estimated coefficients are reported for each variable and standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at the 90% confidence level   **   significant at the 95% confidence level   ***  significant at 
the 99% confidence level  
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Chapter 3 
State Regulation of Long-Term Care Providers 
and the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The rising number of elderly, disabled, and chronically ill individuals in the US 
has brought increased attention to the utilization, cost, and quality of long-term care 
services.  Long-term care encompasses a broad range of services, including both medical 
and non-medical care provided to individuals who need assistance performing activities 
of daily living.  It has been estimated as many as 70 percent of older adults over age 65 
will require long-term care services at some point during their remaining lives (CMS 
2012).  As the major payer for long-term care, state Medicaid programs face the daunting 
challenge of trying to balance the growing needs of an aging population with the 
unwillingness of many state legislators to expand their Medicaid budgets to pay for 
needed services.  This situation has led to growing concerns about the quality of care 
provided to Medicaid residents in nursing homes, as well as a desire among many state 
legislators to cut back on Medicaid reimbursement rates, program eligibility, and the use 
of publically-financed long-term care, more generally.  Consumers, the media, and the 
Institute of Medicine are particularly concerned with care quality in nursing homes.  
Nursing homes are the major providers of long-term care in the US. They have 
also been the main focus of government regulation pertaining to long-term care services.  
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Policies such as certificate-of-need (CON) legislation, which are used by a majority of 
states, set barriers to the addition of new beds in this industry, in order to control the 
overall supply of nursing home services.  Medicaid reimbursement policies, which have 
the most direct and significant effect on nursing home revenue, set the amount and 
method of payment for Medicaid-covered stays in nursing home facilities.  These policies 
not only control the amount of services available, they can also affect the quality of care 
provided by a nursing home.  Under law every nursing home is required to provide the 
same quality of care to all its residents, regardless of their payer source.  Thus, if a 
nursing home reduces its cost of producing care in response to lower Medicaid payment 
rates, erosion in the quality of care for all patients may occur.   
Under the assumption of a binding bed constraint created by CON regulation, 
economic theory suggests that the market for nursing home care will be characterized by 
excess demand among Medicaid-eligible individuals (Scanlon 1980).  In effect, a binding 
bed constraint gives nursing homes the power to choose patients based on the generosity 
of their payment source, leaving lower-paying (and often sicker) Medicaid patients with 
less access to care.  Furthermore, in the presence of excess demand, the effects of 
Medicaid reimbursement rates on care quality are actually ambiguous (Nyman 1985, 
Gertler 1989).  On one hand, an increase in the rate gives a nursing home more resources 
that it could use to produce more quality, as suggested by a basic theory of economic 
production.  If it produces more quality, it could likely attract more private pay patients, 
since quality matters to them.  However, the economic reward of having another private-
pay patient (as opposed to a Medicaid patient) is simply the difference in the prices they 
come with, which will now be lower if the Medicaid rate increases.  In effect, as long as 
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excess demand is present, a nursing home’s return to raising quality can decline with an 
increase in the Medicaid rate.  Thus, it may actually choose to lower quality rather than 
increase it.  This possibility has motivated a number of researchers to empirically 
investigate the relationship between nursing home quality and Medicaid reimbursement 
rates, with particular attention to whether the findings depend on the presence of excess 
demand in the market (Nyman (1985, 1988, 1989), Gertler 1992, Cohen and Spector 
1996, Grabowski (1999, 2001, 2007)).  Findings from these studies have been mixed.  
In recent decades, alternatives have emerged to receiving long-term care in a 
nursing home setting.  In most areas of the US two other types of providers of long-term 
care services are now available, assisted living facilities and home health care agencies.  
Assisted living facilities are community-based, residential long-term care centers, which 
provide housing and supportive services to older adults. Since 1990 the total number of 
beds in assisted living facilities has grown rapidly.  For example, in 2010 there were a 
total of 1,233,690 beds in licensed assisted living facilities across the US, up from 
519,905 in 1990 (AARP 2010).  For all but the most disabled and severely ill patients, an 
assisted living facility may be a feasible substitute for a nursing home.  Such facilities can 
provide both professional medical care and services to assist with activities of daily living.  
Furthermore, assisted living facilities are preferred to nursing homes for older adults who 
seek for more independence and dignity (Perkins et al 2012). There are now 1.8 million 
individuals who live in the nation's 16,000 nursing homes (Kaye 2010) and more than 
735,000 individuals who live in assisted living facilities (NCAL 2012).  
Home health care agencies, which deliver services in a patient’s home, are 
another important substitute for some types of nursing home care.  More and more 
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seniors have shifted from receiving services in nursing homes to receiving services at 
home from home care agencies.  This trend is perhaps not surprising, as most older adults 
strongly prefer staying at home and living independently to being institutionalized 
(Gibson et al. 2003). 
With these significant changes in the structure of the market for long-term care, 
the demand for nursing home care, and the quality of nursing home services may also 
have changed.  In addition, new state regulations have emerged governing Medicaid 
policy and standards of care in assisted living facilities, and these too may be influencing 
equilibrium quality levels in nursing homes.   
Despite the potentially important role of home care agencies and assisted living 
facilities in the long-term care market, no studies to date have considered the effects of 
local competition from these two sectors when looking at the relationship between 
Medicaid regulation and nursing home quality.  Nor has any study considered the 
possible spillover effects of state regulation of businesses in these two other sectors.  Yet, 
analyzing the determinants of nursing home quality in isolation from the rest of the long-
term care market could lead to biased estimates and false conclusions if, in fact, 
competition and state regulations matter in decision-making.  
This study examines the effects of Medicaid regulation on nursing home quality, 
controlling for local market competition from home care agencies and assisted living 
facilities, as well as state regulation of assisted living facilities.  State regulation of 
assisted living facilities can affect nursing home quality by affecting the supply of 
assisted living facilities, which in turn competes with nursing homes.  
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The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 provides background information on 
the long-term market and briefly reviews existing literature on the determinants of 
nursing home quality. Section 2 describes data sources and variable specifications used in 
the empirical analysis, while Section 3 describes statistical methods. Results are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes conclusion from this study, their policy 
implications, and describes possible future work.   
 
3.2 Background 
Several previous studies have examined the effects of Medicaid reimbursement 
rates on nursing home quality.  The earliest studies were based on data from single states.  
Using data on nursing homes in Wisconsin, Nyman (1988, 1989) examined the effects of 
a facility’s Medicaid reimbursement rate on its total number of violations of quality 
standards for nursing homes.  Analyzing data from two different years, 1979 and 1983, 
he found no evidence to suggest quality was higher with higher reimbursement.  In fact, 
he found the opposite: quality was lower in homes receiving a higher Medicaid 
reimbursement rate.  His explanation for these finding was that most nursing homes in 
Wisconsin had excess Medicaid demand in these years due to stringent certificate-of-
need (CON) regulation.  In the presence of excess Medicaid demand, a higher Medicaid 
rate is associated with a lower return to raising quality to attract more private pay patients 
along with no return to raising quality to attract more Medicaid patients.    
Using data on nursing homes in New York State and a different measure of 
quality, Gertler (1992) likewise found an inverse relationship between the Medicaid 
reimbursement rate and quality of care.  He found that a 10% increase in Medicaid 
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expenditures decreased a nursing home’s expenditures on patient services by 3.4%, but 
yet was positively related to the number of Medicaid residents receiving care.  A 10% 
increase in Medicaid expenditures increased the latter by 4.1%.  He too attributed these 
findings to the presence of excess Medicaid demand in most New York markets because 
of the state’s stringent CON regulation. 
More recent studies, however, based mostly on nationwide samples of nursing 
homes (as opposed to single state samples), have found a positive relationship between 
Medicaid reimbursement levels and care quality.  For example, Spector (1996) found a 
positive relationship between the Medicaid reimbursement rate and LPN staffing 
intensity, an input-based measure of quality. Grabowski (2001a) found that the Medicaid 
reimbursement rate had a positive effect on the percentage of residents without facility-
acquired pressure ulcers, which is an important outcomes-based quality indicator.  His 
analysis was based on a nationwide sample of nursing homes observed in 1995 and 1996.  
With the same data Grabowski (2001b) looked at several other measures of care quality, 
as well.  He found a significant positive relationship between the Medicaid 
reimbursement rate and nurse staffing levels per resident.  For example, he found that a 
$40 increase in the reimbursement rate raised the number of registered nurses by 1.42 per 
100 residents. Yet the same increase had insignificant (but still positive) effects on more 
process-based quality indicators, such as the medication error rate in a facility, the 
prevalence of feeding tubes, the prevalence of catheters, and the prevalence of physical 
restraints.  More recently Grabowski (2004) analyzed longitudinal data on nursing homes 
spanning 1991 through 1998, and found that nearly all quality indicators improved as the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate increased.  For example, a 10 percent increase in the 
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Medicaid rate was associated with a 1.8 decrease in the percentage of nursing home 
resident with bedsores.  
In all of the above-mentioned studies the effect of excess Medicaid demand on the 
relationship between nursing home quality and the Medicaid reimbursement rate was 
emphasized.  Several of these studies also suggest that in markets where there are severe 
CON construction moratorium policies on nursing home beds together with excess 
Medicaid demand, the counterintuitive result of an inverse relationship between Medicaid 
reimbursement and quality has resulted.   
The problem of constraints on available beds in long term care facilities appears 
to have lessened since the 1980s, according to a couple of different measures.  One is the 
occupancy rate in nursing homes, which has declined slowly but steadily over time.  For 
example, it was 91.8% in 1985, 87.4% in 1995, and 86% in 2004 (Strahan 1997 and CDC 
2014).   Another indicator is the increasing supply of substitutes for nursing home care, 
such as other home care and community based facilities.  Between 1990 and 2002, for 
example, the number of beds in assisted living facilities nearly doubled, rising from 
519,905 to 1,026,397 nationwide (Harrington et al. 2005).  Home care agencies have also 
become more common.   
It is important to take account of these alternatives to nursing homes, i.e., home 
care agencies and the assisted living facilities, when analyzing the relationship between 
Medicaid policies and nursing home quality.  Yet, surprisingly few previous studies have 
done so.  Bowblis (2012) is an exception.  He examined how the growth of assisted living 
facilities and market structure has affected nursing home quality in Ohio-based nursing 
homes.  Yet, because his sample was limited to a single state, his study was unable to 
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simultaneously address the policy effects of Medicaid.  It is worthwhile to take a close 
look at how market structure and the existence of home and community based services 
can affect the influential power of government regulation on nursing home quality.  
Using data from a nationwide census of nursing homes observed in 2010, this 
study examines the effects of state regulatory policies towards both the nursing home 
sector and the assisted living facilities sector on the quality of care in U.S. nursing homes.  
It addresses two questions.  First, how is nursing home quality affected by a state’s 
Medicaid reimbursement rate and the methods a state uses to control competition from 
other long-term care sectors?  Second, is nursing home quality affected by how a state 
regulates assisted living facilities, and if so, how?  
 
3.3 Data 
Data from several sources were assembled to conduct the analysis.  The primary 
source of data on nursing homes was the on-line 2010 Certification and Survey Provider 
Enhanced Reporting System (CASPER), maintained by the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS).  In addition, other data were drawn from the 2010 Nursing 
Home Compare (NHC) data set maintained by CMS, the Provider of Services File (POS) 
maintained by CMS, the Area Resource File (ARF), the MetLife Market Survey of 
Nursing Homes data, the Assisted Living, Adult Day Services, and Home Care Costs 
(MetLife Market Survey) data, the State Data Book on Long Term Care (State Data 
Book), the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (AL Regulatory Review), and 
assisted living facility supply data collected by Stevenson and Grawboski (2010).   
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The facility-level nursing home data are from the CASPER and NHC data sets.  
The CASPER data set replaces the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR) 
System, which was also maintained by CMS.  CASPER provides comprehensive 
information for every Medicare- or Medicaid-certified nursing home facility in the U.S.  
It provides information on the operational characteristics of each facility along with 
aggregate statistics on its residents.  The CASPER data were merged at the facility-level 
with the NHC data, which provides information on the quality of care at the nursing 
home, as reported by CMS.   
Because our interest centers on the effects of competition between nursing homes, 
home care agencies, and assisted living facilities, nursing homes that were only certified 
as a skilled nursing facility (SNF) were dropped from the sample of facilities to be 
analyzed.  The care provided by SNF-only facilities is much more intense nursing care, 
and arguably is not a substitute for the intermediate-level care provided by home care 
agencies and assisted living facilities.   
Several variables such as the staffing level per bed, the total number of health 
deficiencies, the percentage of empty beds in the county, a Herfindahl index, and case-
mix measurement were all calculated for each facility using the data sets listed above.  
The staffing level was calculated as full-time-equivalent staff per bed, defined as the sum 
of full-time staff, part-time staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons), and 
contract staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons).  The percentage of 
empty beds was derived from the difference between the total number of resident and 
total number of certified nursing home beds for each facility as a percentage of the total 
number of beds, and then averaged at the county level where the nursing home was 
48 
 
  
located. The Herfindahl index was calculated at the county-level and is based on each 
facility’s share of beds, defined as the number of beds in that nursing home divided by 
the total number of beds in that facility’s county.     
Data from the Provider of Service file, which provides information on all certified 
health care institutional providers across the U.S., and the assisted living facility supply 
data collected by Stevenson and Grabowski were merged with the nursing home facility 
file based on each nursing home’s zip code.  The assisted living data collected by 
Stevenson and Grabowski describes assisted living facilities across the entire U.S., as of 
2007.  Before merging their data with the 2010 nursing home file, their variables were 
each adjusted to reflect 2010 levels, based on the aggregate growth rate in assisted living 
facilities, as reported by the AARP report on Assisted Living and Residential Care in the 
States in 2010.  Data from the ARF were likewise merged to the nursing home file based 
on the county.  Variables merged from the ARF were county-specific demographic 
characteristics, including per capita income, race, gender, the poverty rate, the mortality 
rate, and a region identifier.  
The MetLife Market Survey was collected by the MetLife Mature Market 
Institute. It contains daily private-pay price levels for nursing homes, monthly rates for 
assisted living facilities, hourly rates for home health care agencies, and daily prices for 
adult day services. The private rates are mainly state-level average rates, with some 
metropolitan areas reported as well. Using state-level price information instead of 
recording it at facility level could help avoid the endogeneity problem between price and 
quality, thus the state average private price levels were merged with the other previous 
mentioned data sets to provide private-pay rates for each long-term care facility. 
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Data on state regulations covering long-term care facilities were also added to the 
nursing home file.  Most of the variables describing nursing home and assisted living 
facility regulation take the form of (0,1) indicators.  These variables were derived from 
information reported in the State Data Book on Long Term Care (2007) Program and 
Market Characteristics (funded by the U.S Department of Housing and Urban 
Development) and the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (2007) (prepared by the 
National Center for Assisted Living).  
According to the State Date Book on Long Term Care, there are four types of 
rate-setting systems for nursing homes, including prospectively set, flat rate, case-mix 
based, and combination-type systems. The strictest is a flat rate system because it sets a 
uniform level of reimbursement for the same class of homes, regardless of their variation 
in costs.  In contrast, a case-mix based system adjusts a nursing home’s rate based on its 
residents’ case-mix, which reflects differences in need.  Under a prospective rate system 
a nursing home’s reimbursement rate is set in advance, based on the previous costs level 
of each facility, but it doesn’t account for the actual costs.  A combination system has 
both prospective and retrospective elements to how rates are set, so that interim rates 
eventually align closer to actual costs. Since only one state has a flat rate system and one 
state has a case-mix based system, this analysis could control for only the prospective and 
combination systems in the regression models estimated. 
State rate-setting systems for assisted living facilities can likewise be categorized 
according to the type of system.  In 2010 there were five different approaches seen across 
the different states: a flat rate system, a tiered rate system, a case-mix based rate, a fee-
for-service (FFS) based rate, and a negotiated rate system.  A flat rate system for assisted 
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living facilities, just like a flat rate system for nursing homes, does not allow any 
adjustments for conditional differences across assisted living facilities.  Rather, each 
facility receives the same flat rate.  A case-mix based system has the same basic logic as 
a case-mix reimbursement system for nursing homes.  A tiered rate system is quite 
similar to a case-mix based system, except it typically has fewer rate categories than a 
case-mix based system.  Under a fee-for-service rate setting scheme, instead of receiving 
a monthly payment, the assisted living facility has to send bill to the payment agency 
based on the services delivered to the resident. Finally, a negotiated rate system is a 
method that combines some or all features of the other four systems.    
   In addition to their rate-setting system, the analysis controls for several other 
aspects of state regulation of assisted living facilities.  "Assisted living CON" measures 
whether the state has a CON program in effect for assisted living facilities. "AL scope of 
care" indicates whether the facility could provide skilled nursing services to residents. 
"AL Medicaid Waiver" and "state plan" measure whether the state allows Medicaid to 
cover the costs of assisted living services through a Medicaid Waiver program or state 
plan.  
Table 3.1 describes all of the variables used in the analysis and their sources.             
 
3.4 Econometric Framework  
3.4.1 Market Definition   
Following previous studies I define the local market as the county where the 
nursing home is located (Nyman 1985, Gertler 1992, Cohen and Spector 1996, 
Grabowski and Hirth 2003).  Thus, we presume that competition among long term care 
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providers takes place mainly in the facility’s county and not outside it.  Nyman (1994) 
found 80% of residents in Wisconsin facilities chose a nursing home located in the 
county in which they resided before entering the home, and Gertler (1989) found 75% of 
nursing home residents in New York state were likewise from the same county where 
their facility was located.  Thus, although not perfect, the county may be a reasonable 
proxy for the relevant market. 
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables in the Models   
The presence of local excess demand for nursing home placement can affect 
competition among suppliers.  When there is a bed constraint in the supply of nursing 
home care, theory suggests that private-pay consumer will be satisfied first because of 
their higher pay rates.  Remaining beds will then be filled with Medicaid eligibles.  Thus, 
“excess-demanders” are typically Medicaid eligibles.  Excess demand in a market can 
affect care quality.  As long as quality is higher than the minimum required level, nursing 
home beds will be filled by Medicaid eligibles.  In effect, individuals on Medicaid lose 
their right to choose a nursing home based on its quality; instead they are simply wait-
listed for the first facility where an available bed opens up.  This reduces the willingness 
of nursing homes to provide better quality and to compete based on quality. An increase 
in the Medicaid rate may even have the reverse effect on nursing home quality.  The 
present analysis will control for local excess demand in analyzing the determinants of 
nursing home quality. The county-wide average percentage of empty beds in nursing 
homes is used as a proxy for excess demand. 
Nursing home care quality is multidimensional.  Measures fall into three 
categories: structural or input-based measures, process-of-care measures, and outcome-
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related measures.  Structural measures are organizational characteristics of the nursing 
home, and include staffing levels as well as the scope of the nursing home’s health-
related deficiencies, such as the number of federal minimum quality standards the facility 
fails to fulfill.  Process measures include the prevalence of indwelling catheters among 
the facility’s residents, the prevalence of tube feeding, the prevalence of physical 
restraints, and the facility’s drug error rate.  In general, process measures depend on and 
reflect the interactions occurring between the nursing home’s staff and its residents.  
Outcome measures, such as the prevalence of pressure sores in the nursing home, are 
widely regarded as the most straightforward measures of care quality.  Outcome 
measures represent changes in resident characteristics directly attributable to the practice 
and environment of the nursing home.  
In this analysis measures from all three categories are used.  Table 3.2 lists the 
nine variables in the analysis that measure care quality and their type.  Although 
registered nurses (RN) per bed, licensed practical nurses (LPN) per bed, and nurse aids 
per bed are all measures of staffing levels, these different types of nursing staff should 
not be regarded as perfect substitutes.  RNs have the broadest scope-of-practice under 
state licensure regulations, have more medical training, and in any nursing home they 
provide the more intensive and skilled nursing services.  LPNs focus more on daily 
medical routines that help preserve a resident’s well being. The all-day-round care 
provided by nurse aids can possibly affect a resident’s satisfaction and his/her mood.  To 
acknowledge these differences in roles, all three are used as quality indicators in the 
analysis. Measurements of catheter and pressure sores are adjusted for pre-existing 
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conditions where the prevalence is recorded as percentage of residents who did not have 
but acquired catheter or pressure sore during the stay in nursing home facilities.   
The models to be estimated also control for the case mix of residents because this 
too may affect quality. Residents who are more disabled generally require higher levels 
of care, and they tend to preform worse on outcome-based measures of quality. The 
Management Minutes system designed by Bill Thoms (1975) is used to adjust this bias. It 
is expressed in minutes of staffs' time where different prevalence of disability is given 
different weight based on the level of sickness. The indicators of disabilities are mutually 
exclusive and expressed in term of percentage of residents. In order to avoid 
multicolinearity in the statistical analysis, any quality indicator that is embodied in the 
case-mix system is abandoned from the group of dependant variables.  
The case mix index was calculated as follows:  
Case-Mix Index = A(20) + B(18) + C(30) + D(30) + E(20) + F(48) + G(90) + 
H(90) + I(45) + J(32) +  K(20) + L(50) + M(36) 
where A through M are: (A) the percentage of residents needing full assistance 
bathing, (B) the percentage needing partial assistance bathing, (C) the percentage needing 
full assistance dressing, (D) the percentage needing partial assistance dressing, (E) the 
percentage who are catheterized, (F) the percentage who are incontinent, (G) the 
percentage needing parenteral feeding, (H) the percentage needing tube feeding, (I) the 
percentage needing assistance eating, (J) the percentage who are nonambulatory, (K) the 
percentage with pressure sores, (L) the percentage receiving bowel/bladder retraining, 
and (M) the percentage receiving special skin care.  
3.4.3 Model Specification 
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Linear regression models are adopted, one for each measure of nursing home 
quality.  Because of the possible correlation between long-term care regulation policies 
and the market supply of nursing home, home care, and assisted living facility, a 
Hausman test is used to check for the endogenous of nursing home beds, per capita home 
care agencies, and per capita assisted living beds. The results ruled out the possible 
endogeneity of nursing home beds and home care agency, but failed to reject the 
possibility of endogeneity of per capita assisted living beds in the county. To address this 
issue, all of the quality models were estimated via two-stage least squares (2SLS).  State 
regulations specific to assisted living facilities are good candidates for instrumental 
variables, as they are expected to influence assisted living facilities but should not affect 
nursing home outcomes.  In this study state regulations regarding assisted living facility's 
allowed scope of care, reimbursement methods, and whether there was a Medicaid waiver 
in place allowing for coverage in such facilities were used as instruments in the first stage 
of estimation.  
However, some other policy variables such as assisted living private-pay price 
level and assisted living Certificate of Need regulation might be correlated with the 
nursing home quality indicators as well. These variables are left out of the first-stage 
regression and are instead used as additional independent variables in the second stage 
regression.    
Equation (1) below describes the basic linear regression model for care quality.  
Qim measures the care quality of nursing home i in market m. Xim is a vector of facility 
characteristics for nursing home i in market m.  Sm is a vector of measures of competition 
and private price from nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and home care agencies in 
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market m.  Zm is a vector of the demographics of the local population, measured at the 
county-level.  Finally, RmNHAL is a vector of variables measuring nursing home state 
regulations and AL CON. 
Qim = β1Xim + β2SmNH + β3SmHC + β4SmAL + β5Zm + β6RmNHAL + εim   (1) 
Because of the endogeneity of the assisted living beds per capita, the actual 
regression model is estimated using 2SLS, with instrument variables to address the 
endogeneity of assisted living beds per capita.  In the first stage, the equation estimated is: 
SmAL = β1Xim + β2SmNH + β3SmHC + β4Zm + β5RmNH + β6RmAL + εm    (2) 
where SmAL is endogenous, and the vector, RmAL , is a set of instrumental variables 
describing state regulation of assisted living facilities other than AL CON.  In the second 
stage, the equation estimated is: 
Qim = β1Xim + β2SmNH + β3SmHC + β4ŜmAL + β5Zm + β6RmNHAL + εim  (3) 
where ŜmAL is a vector of predicted values for SmAL that are estimated from equation (2).  
 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.3 reports the mean and standard deviations for variables used in the 
analysis. 
As noted earlier, the nine quality indicators examined all three types of quality 
measure, i.e., input-based, process-based, and outcome-based measures.  The first three 
measure staffing levels, and are each computed as number of nursing staff per 1000 
nursing home beds. This scale is used for the convenience of presenting coefficients.  As 
an input factor for residents’ health conditions, an increase in the staffing level per bed 
indicates a better nursing home quality. The other six quality indicators measure the 
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deficiencies in health service, care procedures, and health outcomes, and they are 
negative indicators of care quality.  For example, the higher the percentage of residents 
who have facility-acquired pressure sores, the lower the quality of care in the nursing 
home.  A positive relationship of an independent variable with a positive quality indicator 
means that an increase in that variable increases quality, whereas a positive relationship 
with a negative quality indicator means that an increase in that independent variable 
decreases quality. 
County-level demographic characteristics include county per capita income, the 
percentage of females in the adult population, the percentage of the population ages 65 
and older, the mortality rate, the poverty rate, and whether the county is urban or rural.  
County per capita income is included to measure ability to pay for long term care in the 
county. The percentage of adult females is a proxy for the availability of informal care 
provided by family members. Since women are the major caregivers in families this is 
likely a good proxy.  Whether a certain county is located in a metropolitan area is 
included because previous studies have found this to be predictive of quality.  
Four variables measure the market’s structure and competition from outside and 
within the nursing home sector.  Competition from assisted living is represented by the 
number of assisted living facility beds per capita in the county.  This measure is 
preferable to the number of assisted living facilities per capita for two reasons.  First, the 
size of assisted living facilities varies tremendously, e.g., a single facility may have 5 or 
500 beds.  Thus, simply using the number of facilities would fail to capture the true 
availability of beds outside of nursing homes.  Second, compared to the number of 
assisted living facilities, the number of beds is more likely to affect the overall demand 
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for nursing home placements.  With regard to the home health agencies, whose services 
are not generally counted in terms of beds, the number of home care agencies per capita 
in the county is used as a proxy for competition from the home health care sector.  
Competition from other nursing homes is measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI) of 
nursing home bed share in each county. The competition index used in this regression is 
adjusted by 1 minus the actual Herfindahl index. After the alternation, a higher adjusted 
HHI value indicates more competition within the nursing home sector.  
Table 3.4 reports key findings from the 2SLS regressions estimated for all nine 
quality measures.  The full regression models, which control for all of the variables 
shown in the data summary, are included in the appendix B. 
Just as anticipated, nursing home quality is affected by local competition from 
assisted living facilities and home care agencies. As shown in Table 3.4, increased 
competition from home care agencies has significant effects on seven out of the nine 
quality indicators. Competition was mainly focused in the labor market where both home 
care agencies and nursing homes are trying to get more professional nursing staff. The 
marginal effect of one unit increase in the home care agency per capita would lead to a 
decrease of 6943.63 nurse aides for 1000 nursing home beds. However, the competition 
from home care agencies doesn’t bring down nursing home quality measured by number 
of health deficiencies, percentage physically restrained resident, percentage with facility 
acquired catheters and drug error rate. Increased competition from assisted living 
facilities also has significant effects on nursing home quality. These effects will be 
analyzed with assisted living regulations coefficients in Table 3.5 in more detail. 
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These results show the importance of controlling for the long-term care market 
competition when analyzing the policy effects on nursing home quality. Estimation in an 
isolated market is biased and far from the reality. 
After controlling for excess demand and local competition from all three types of 
long-term care providers, the Medicaid reimbursement rate is positively and significantly 
associated with nursing home quality.  A one dollar increase in the reimbursement rate 
leads to an increase of 0.12 RNs per 1000 beds, 0.578 LPNs per 1000 beds, and 0.571 
nurse aids per 1000 beds.  An increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate also has 
uniformly positive and significant effects on process-based and outcome-based measures 
of quality.  Raising the Medicaid price by one dollar decreases the number of health-
related deficiencies by 0.159, the drug error rate by 0.006 percent, the prevalence of 
antipsychotic medications by 0.017 percent, and the prevalence of catheters by 0.004 
percent. Although these effects are small, they are all statistically significant.  
These results imply that the excess demand hypothesis, which states that nursing 
home quality and Medicaid rate will change counter-intuitively, does not apply to the 
market conditions of 2010, for which these models are estimated.  This may be due to the 
growth in other forms of long-term care services. Medicaid residents as well as the 
private residents become limited resources that all sectors are competing with each other 
in terms of quality. A higher price level will lead directly to higher quality as suggested 
by economics theories. Any factor that will decrease the Medicaid price level will reduce 
the nursing home quality. 
The effects of CON regulation on nursing home quality are mixed.  CON 
regulations significantly raise nurse staffing levels.  One interpretation is that, to the 
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extent that CON regulations lower available nursing home beds, nursing homes 
compensate by staffing more intensely.  However, their more-intense staffing does not 
bring up the quality in nursing homes. Instead, nursing homes located in states with CON 
have, on average, four more health deficiencies and 0.58% more residents who are 
physically restrained, compared to nursing homes in non-CON states. This finding 
suggests that CON may improve staffing inputs, but this improvement dose not lead to a 
further increase in nursing home quality, at least according to process-based and 
outcome-based measures.  Regulatory agencies should try to protect the quality level of 
nursing homes first before reducing nursing home beds. 
Studies that examined the effects of Medicaid reimbursement methods, not just 
the level of the Medicaid rate, such as Cohen and Dubay (1990) and Grabowski (2001), 
found that stricter, flat-rate methods tend to have more negative effects on staffing levels, 
and fewer positive effects on other measures of quality.  Prospective rate-setting methods 
are the strictest compared to combination systems in this paper, and the regression results 
are consistent with the previous literature. Both systems have positive effects on staffing 
levels, as measured by LPNs per 1000 beds and nurses aids per 1000 beds.  These two 
rate-setting methods also appear to significantly reduce the prevalence of health 
deficiencies and pressure sores.  Regarding other process-based quality measures, such as 
the prevalence of physical restraints and antipsychotic medications, the prospective rate-
setting methods cause a rise in the prevalence of both conditions. In contrast, the 
coefficients are not statistically significant for combination systems.  
Rate-setting systems that adjust for a nursing home’s case mix appear to have 
mixed effects on quality.  They increase LPN staffing levels, while decreasing RN and 
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nurse aid staffing levels.  They also appear to reduce the drug error rate and the 
prevalence of physical restraints, but increase the prevalence of antipsychotic 
medications and catheters.  Their effect on the prevalence of pressure sores is negative as 
well. 
The effects of state regulations regarding assisted living facilities on care quality 
in nursing homes are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The direct effect is from the AL 
CON regulation and AL beds per capita. The indirect effects are from the AL regulation 
factors onto the AL beds supply, which is a direct competition factor to nursing home 
quality, then further associated with quality level provided in nursing homes.  
As far as its direct impact on quality, competition from assisted living facility, 
which is measured by number of beds per capita in each county, has mixed effects on 
nursing home quality. It improves the staffing level quality indicators, while it reduces 
quality indicated by process measurements.  
  The positive effects on the staffing level can be explained by the different in care 
level the two kinds of facilities provide. Residents in assisted living facility, referred to as 
“low-care” patients by Mor et al (2007), generally have better health conditions and 
require less services than the ones in nursing homes. As a result, there will be more staffs 
needed and hired in counties where competition from assisted living facilities have 
attracted the "low-care" residents and left nursing homes with "high-care" residents. 
Furthermore, this condition also helps explain the negative effects on resident outcome. 
Because the "high-care" residents generally have high level of disabilities, their measured 
health conditions will be lower as well. Overall, factors including number of health 
deficiencies, percentage physically restrained, percentage catheters, and drug error rate 
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are more severe in places with higher number of assisted living beds per capita. For 
example, when the assisted living beds per capita increases by 1, it will increase health 
deficiencies in nursing homes by 123.72, drug error rate by 4.24%, percentage physically 
restrained by 6.32%, and percentage acquired catheters by 3.68%.  
Because of the negative effects of assisted living competition on nursing home 
quality, a factor that controls the competition from assisted living facilities, such as the 
assisted living CON, will generally increase nursing home quality. Nursing homes 
operate in state with assisted living CON will have 9 less health deficiencies than homes 
operate in states that do not control the growth speed of assisted living facilities.  There 
will also be 0.49% less physically restrained, 0.58% less antipsychotic and 0.15% less 
catheters in those nursing facilities. 
The effects of other AL regulation policies on AL beds from the first step 
regression are listed in Table 3.6. When states allow assisted living facilities to provide 
skilled nursing care, the AL bed supply in that state will be higher by 0.024 beds per 
capita. Although the bed supply is not significantly higher in states allowing Medicaid 
waiver to pay for the AL services, it is higher when there is state plan to cover the costs. 
The coefficient of the flat rate reimbursement method on AL beds per capita is -0.051, 
with similar effects from other methods of payments. All kinds of the AL reimbursement 
methods are associated with the bed supply negatively, except for the most generous FFS 
reimbursement. This might because of the fact that Medicaid generally pay lower than the 
private insurance. In states where Medicaid can be used to pay for assisted living costs, 
there will be more residents using Medicaid instead of private long-term care insurance in 
the facilities. According to Stevenson et al (2010) assisted living facilities distribute 
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disproportionally in areas where there are more private-paying residents. So no matter 
which kind of payment the Medicaid reimbursement system uses, the assisted living bed 
supply will be lower.  
Using the chain rule (i.e., dy/dz = dy/dx*dx/dz) we see that the indirect effect of 
assisted living regulations on nursing home quality can be derived as the product of their 
marginal effect on AL beds and the marginal effect of AL beds on care quality.  The 
cross products are shown only for the variables with significant coefficients at both steps. 
Variables which have positive effects on the growth of assisted living facilities are 
now negatively associated with nursing home quality.  Application of the chain rule 
implies that in states that allow nursing care to be provided in AL facilities and which 
also cover Medicaid services using state plans, there will be about 6 less LPNs per bed in 
nursing homes, 3 more health deficiencies occurring in nursing homes, a 0.10% increase 
in the drug error rate, a 0.15% increase in the prevalence of physical restraints, and a 
0.09% increase in the prevalence of catheters. 
On the other hand, the reimbursement methods have positive effects on nursing 
home process-based and outcome-based quality measures. For example, the total number 
of health deficiencies is reduced by about 4.08 to 8.78, the drug error rate is reduced by 
0.14% to 0.30%, the prevalence of physical restraints is reduced by 0.21% to 0.45, and 
the prevalence of catheters is reduced by 0.12% to 0.26%. The AL case-mix 
reimbursement method has the highest magnitude in affecting the nursing home quality 
among all the other systems.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
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The market for long-term care and the nature of competition among suppliers has 
evolved over the last two decades.  Assisted living facilities and home care agencies are 
far more prevalent nowadays compared to 1990, and these providers compete with 
nursing homes to provide services to individuals who are higher-functioning, e.g., who 
need assistance with a few activities of daily living but not continuous, 24-hour support.  
With the exception of Bowblis (2012), existing empirical studies of the determinants of 
nursing home quality have generally assumed that nursing homes only compete with 
other nursing homes and not with other types of firms providing substitutes for nursing 
home care, at least among higher-functioning, less disabled individuals.  This paper has 
examined the effects of state regulation of long-term care providers on care quality in 
nursing home, controlling for the local competition effects from other long-term care 
providers.  From this nationally representative analysis of data on 13,436 nursing homes, 
all observed in 2010, three key findings emerge. 
First, a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate leads to definite improvements in 
care quality in nursing homes.  This statement applies to nine different quality measures, 
including input-based, process-based, and outcome-based indicators.  Given the 
widespread presence of assisted living facilities and home care agencies, which for some 
patients are feasible alternatives to nursing homes, a presumption that excess demand 
gives rise to a negative relationship between Medicaid reimbursement rates and nursing 
home quality just isn’t plausible anymore.  An increase in the Medicaid daily rate leads to 
significant increases in a nursing home’s RNs, LPNs, and nurses aids per bed, and 
significant decreases in a home’s total number of health deficiencies, the occurrence of 
medication errors, the prevalence of antipsychotic medications, and the prevalence of 
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catheters.  The method used by a state for setting Medicaid rates also has quality 
repercusions.  Prospective rate setting systems and combination systems raise some 
aspects of care quality in nursing homes, at least compared to flat-rate systems.  
Second, the presence of nursing home CON regulations also has positive effects 
on nursing home staffing levels. However, other measures, such as process-based and 
outcome-based quality indicators respond negatively to the presence of CON.  One 
interpretation is that, faced with a bed constraint, nursing homes are substituting labor for 
capital, but such substitution does not raise care quality when measured via any non-
staffing measure.  
Finally, care quality in nursing homes also responds significantly to local market 
competition from assisted living facilities and home care agencies, not just from other 
nearby nursing homes.  Nursing homes are no longer an isolated long-term care sector, 
and their care quality reflects that. This study found that competition from home care 
agencies has mixed effects on nursing home quality. Its effects on staff-to-bed ratios were 
mostly negative, whereas its effects on other structure, process, and outcome quality 
measures were mostly positive. The presence of local competition from assisted living 
facilities has mixed but mostly negative effects on care quality.  For example, more 
assisted living beds in a nursing home’s market improves the home’s staffing levels, but 
increases its number of health deficiencies, the prevalence of medication errors, physical 
restraints, and catheters among residents.    
Related to this, state CON programs for assisted living facilities, which in effect 
constrain competition from assisted living facilities, generally raise care quality in 
nursing homes.  In states with such programs nursing homes incur fewer health 
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deficiencies, and they have lower rates of physical restraints, antipsychotic medications, 
and catheter use among their residents.  Additionally, when states allow assisted living 
facilities to provide skilled nursing care, nursing homes lower nurse staffing levels, but at 
the same time they incur more health deficiencies and have a higher prevalence of 
medication errors, physical restraints, and catheters among residents.  Similar findings 
occurred in states that cover long-term care for Medicaid residents in assisted living 
facilities.   
The main policy implication of this study is that Medicaid regulations have 
significant effects on nursing home quality.  Like Grabowski (2001), this study finds 
strong evidence that lower Medicaid reimbursement rates decrease nursing home quality, 
regardless of how it is measured.  Further, this fundamental result holds even when 
quality models control for competition from home care agencies and assisted living 
facilities.   When a state reduces its payment rate, nursing homes sacrifice quality to 
make ends meet.  State CON programs also tend to lower quality.  Although CON 
programs save on Medicaid outlays, they end up hurting all nursing home residents, 
whose wellbeing is reduced by lower quality care.  Governments need to weigh these 
costs against the benefits before implementing CON.  The methods for setting Medicaid 
rates also matter.  In particular, methods that adjust for actual costs, such as retrospective 
rate-setting systems, have an advantage over other approaches, in that they improve 
nursing home quality.      
As far as the interaction between nursing home quality and assisted living 
regulation, policies that restraint the growth of assisted living facilities will raise nursing 
home quality. However, this does not mean states should impede the growth of the 
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assisted living sector. Policy makers need to take into account changes in residents’ 
characteristic and quality of services of nursing homes after the rapid growth of home and 
community based services when they set the reimbursement level of nursing homes. 
Building a segmented market may be useful in establishing state regulations and 
improving efficiency.  
However, based on the nature of the analyzing model, we cannot rule out the 
possibility of some third factor that is correlated with the policy factors and nursing home 
quality in longitudinal settings. Further research needs to be done using panel data of the 
whole long-term care market.  
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Tables for Chapter 3: 
Table 3.1 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition Source 
Quality Measures 
RN/Beds Total number of registered nurses per beds in each nursing 
facility 
CASPER 
LPN/Beds Total number of licensed practical nurses  per beds in each 
nursing facility 
CASPER 
Nurse Aides/Beds Total number of Nurse Aides per beds in each nursing 
facility 
CASPER 
Health Deficiencies  Number of regulatory health deficiencies in each nursing 
facility 
NHC 
Drug Error Rate  Percentage of drug error in each facility CASPER 
Percentage  Physically 
Restrained 
Percentage of resident in each facility who are physically 
restrained 
CASPER 
Percentage  
Antipsychotic 
Percentage of resident in each facility who use antipsychotic 
medication 
CASPER 
Percentage  Acquired 
Catheters 
Percentage of resident in each facility who acquired catheter 
during the stay 
CASPER 
Percentage Acquired 
Pressure Sores 
Percentage of resident in each facility who are acquired 
pressure sore during the stay 
CASPER 
Nursing Home Facility Characteristics 
NH Beds Per Capita Nursing home total beds per capita for each facility CASPER 
NH Ownership Dummy variable if Government owned=1; 0=otherwise CASPER 
For/Non- Profit Dummy variable For-profit=1; Non-profit=0 CASPER 
Provider Based Facility Dummy variable =1 if provider based; 0=otherwise CASPER 
Percentage Medicaid 
Residents 
Percentage of Medicaid residents in each facility CASPER 
Special Care Beds  Percentage of nursing home beds for Alzheimer patients CASPER 
Case-Mix Index Case mix measurement for each facility CASPER 
Market Structure 
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NH Avg Empty Beds Average percentage of nursing home empty beds in county CASPER 
HC Agency Per Capita Number of home care agencies per capita in county POS 
AL Beds Per Capita Number of assisted living beds per capita in county Stevensen 2010 
NH Herfindahl Index  Nursing home Herfindahl Index in each county CASPER 
County Demographic Characteristics 
Census Region Code 1=Northeast 2=Midwest 3=South 4=West ARF 
County Per Capita 
Income 
Per capita income in each county ARF 
Population 65+ Percentage of population age 65 and over in county ARF 
Adult Female Percentage of population adult female in county ARF 
Medicaid Eligible  Percentage of Medicaid eligible older adults in 65 and over 
age group in each county 
ARF 
Mortality Rate County mortality rate ARF 
Poverty Rate County poverty rate ARF 
Percentage White Percentage white population in county  ARF 
Percentage Black Percentage black population in county ARF 
Population Density Population density per square mile in county ARF 
Low Education Type Dummy variable for low educational region ARF 
State Policy Factors 
NH Medicaid Price Nursing home Medicaid per diem price State Data Book 
NH CON Dummy variable for state nursing home CON regulation State Data Book 
NH Prospective 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for prospective reimbursement system State Data Book 
NH Combination 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for combination reimbursement system State Data Book 
NH Case-Mix Adjusters Dummy variable of whether the reimbursement rate is 
adjusted for case-mix 
State Data Book 
NH Price Ratio Nursing home Medicaid reimbursement rate over nursing 
home private pay price 
MetLife Market 
Survey 
AL Daily Avg Price Assisted living facility private-pay daily average price MetLife Market 
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Survey 
HC hourly Avg Price Home health care agency private-pay hourly average price MetLife Market 
Survey 
Adult Day Care Daily 
Avg Price 
Adult day care facility private-pay daily average price MetLife Market 
Survey 
AL CON Dummy variable for state assisted living Certificates of 
Need regulation 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Facility Scope of 
Care 
Dummy variable of whether the assisted living facility could 
provide nursing services 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Medicaid Waiver Dummy variable of whether the state Medicaid waiver could 
cover assisted living costs 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL State Plan   Dummy variable of whether there is a state plan to cover 
assisted living costs 
AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Flat Rate 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for flat rate reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Tiered Rate 
Reimbursement  
Dummy variable for tiered rate reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Case-Mix 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for case-mix reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL FFS Reimbursement Dummy variable for fee-for-service reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
AL Negotiated 
Reimbursement 
Dummy variable for negotiated reimbursement system AL Regulatory 
Review 
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Table 3.2  Type of Quality Indicators   
Quality Indicator Type of Indicator 
RN/Bed Structure 
LPN/Bed Structure 
Nurse Aids/Bed Structure 
Health Deficiency Structure 
Drug Error Rate Process 
Percentage Physically Restrained Process 
Percentage  Antipsychotic Process 
Percentage  Acquire Catheters Process 
Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores Outcome 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of All Variables 
Total observation number: 13426  
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. 
RN/Beds 0.07169 0.08586 
LPN/Beds 0.135396 0.126905 
Nurse Aides/Beds 0.378815 0.185241 
Health Deficiencies  14.98494 11.32956 
Drug Error Rate  1.504207 4.067297 
Percentage  Physically Restrained 3.11389 5.58665 
Percentage  Antipsychotic 25.19481 14.81464 
Percentage  Acquire Catheters 1.623429 2.80799 
Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores 2.941331 3.245092 
NH Beds Per Capita 0.165465 0.148378 
NH Ownership 0.761367 0.426264 
For/Non- Profit 0.705123 0.456005 
Provider Based Facility 0.048494 0.214816 
Percentage Medicaid Residents 62.89192 19.74553 
Special Care Beds  4.987203 13.21166 
Case-Mix Index 141.9866 43.93583 
NH Avg Empty Beds 17.34904 10.53505 
HC Agency Per Capita 0.036434 0.057068 
AL Beds Per Capita 0.311181 0.221559 
Herfindahl Index (1-HHI) 0.7740254 0.2565023 
Census Region Code 2.461169 0.946563 
County Per Capita Income (in 1000s) 1.722276 0.721113 
Population 65+ 14.08715 3.631144 
Adult Female 30.0873 2.268431 
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Variables  Mean Std. Dev. 
Medicaid eligible  15.28146 7.763679 
Mortality Rate 0.904158 0.23473 
Poverty Rate 15.58205 5.318782 
Percentage White 77.39127 16.67342 
Percentage Black 11.00004 12.85455 
Population Density  (in1000s) 1.244913 4.045115 
Low Education Type 0.121789 0.327054 
NH Medicaid Per Diem Price 142.3166 37.54888 
NH CON 0.773915 0.41831 
NH Prospective Reimbursement 0.849497 0.357577 
NH Combination Reimbursement 0.136091 0.342898 
NH Case-Mix Adjusters 0.677738 0.46736 
NH Price Ratio 132.4298 68.02018 
AL Daily Avg Price 107.2017 19.53959 
HC hourly Avg Price 20.66501 2.799751 
Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price 60.38816 17.47155 
AL CON 0.156333 0.363184 
AL Facility Scope of Care 0.749871 0.434623 
AL Medicaid Waiver 0.716859 0.450541 
AL State Plan   0.244645 0.487086 
AL Flat Rate Reimbursement 0.312043 0.463347 
AL Tiered Rate Reimbursement  0.432814 0.495487 
AL Case-Mix Reimbursement 0.14892 0.356025 
AL FFS Reimbursement 0.070242 0.255565 
AL Negotiated Reimbursement 0.035982 0.186253 
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Table 3.4  Two-stage Least Square Regression Model on Nursing Home Quality Indicators: 
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Table 3.5 Second-stage Regression and Cross-product Coefficients: 
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Table 3.6 First-stage Regression on Assisted Living Beds Per Capita: 
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2 
Case-mix based on Grabowski (2001) is calculated as follows:  
A(20) + B(18) + C(30) + D(30) + E(20) + F(48) + G(90) + H(90) + I(45) + J(32) + K(20) 
+ L(50) + M(36) 
A=% of residents need full assistance bathing 
B=% of residents need partial assistance bathing 
C=% of residents need full assistance dressing 
D=% of residents need partial assistance dressing 
E=% of residents catheterized 
F=% of residents incontinent 
G=% of residents need parenteral feeding 
H=% of residents need tube feeding 
I=% of residents need assistance eating 
J=% of residents nonambulatory 
K=% of residents with pressure sores 
L=% of residents receive bowel/bladder retraining 
M=% of residents receive special skin care  
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APPENDIX B 
FULL REGRESSION FOR CHAPTER 2 
1. 2SLS QUALITY REGRESSION: 
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APPENDIX C 
FULL REGRESSION FOR CHAPTER 3 
1. 2SLS QUALITY REGRESSION 
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2. FIRST STAGE REGRESSION  
AL Beds Per Capita Coef. Std. Err.  
NH Beds Per Capita 6.59951 0.29603 *** 
Avg Empty Beds -0.00033 0.00024  
Ownership -0.01667 0.00952 * 
For/Non- Profit 0.01100 0.00918  
Provider Based Facility 0.00564 0.00993  
Percentage Medicaid Residents -0.00014 0.00011  
Special Care Beds 0.00013 0.00015  
Case Mix 0.00006 0.00005  
HC Agencies Per Capita 21.01664 0.15630 *** 
NH HHI 0.02557 0.01034 *** 
Census Region Code 0.01502 0.00382 *** 
County Per Capita Income -0.00404 0.00466  
Population 65+ 0.00392 0.00132 *** 
Adult Female 0.00533 0.00128 *** 
Percentage Medicaid eligible 0.00177 0.00045 *** 
Mortality Rate -0.00481 0.02133  
Poverty Rate -0.00444 0.00071 *** 
Percentage White -0.00120 0.00035 *** 
Percentage Black -0.00115 0.00039 *** 
Population Density -0.00177 0.00065 *** 
Low Education Type 0.04904 0.00847 *** 
NH Medicaid Per Diem Price 0.00041 0.00012 *** 
NH price ratio -0.00002 0.00006  
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AL daily avg price 0.00014 0.00019  
HC hourly avg price 0.00209 0.00127 * 
Adult day care daily avg price 0.00043 0.00016 *** 
NH CON -0.00796 0.01006  
AL CON -0.01893 0.00858 ** 
NH Prospective Reimbursement 0.02046 0.01977  
NH Combination Rimbursement 0.02655 0.02018  
NH Case-Mix Adjusters -0.00759 0.00700  
AL Facility Scope of Care 0.02435 0.00816 *** 
AL Medicaid Waiver 0.00775 0.00724  
AL State Plan 0.02511 0.00787 *** 
AL Flat Rate Reimbursement -0.05078 0.01415 *** 
AL Tiered Rate Reimbursement -0.03278 0.01508 ** 
AL Case-Mix Reimbursement -0.07073 0.01580 *** 
AL FFS Reimbursement -0.01398 0.01818  
AL Negotiated Reimbursement -0.06289 0.01939 *** 
Con_ -0.23682 0.07282 *** 
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This dissertation examines the factors that will affect nursing home quality of care 
using several national data sources on market regulation, county demographic 
characteristics, market structural and the characteristics of different types of long-term 
care providers in 2010.  
The first study examines how nine different measures of nursing home care 
quality respond to the greater levels of local market competition from these alternative 
providers of long-term care, as well as other nursing homes. Findings reveal that faced 
with greater competition from assisted living facilities, nursing homes are left to care for 
more disabled, less healthy patients. Although the nursing home’s staff-to-bed ratios rise 
in response, other measures of care quality decline, such as more process- and outcome-
based measures.  Competition from home health agencies likewise has mixed effects on 
nursing home care quality, and competition from other nursing homes in a market tends 
to decrease care quality.  These finding suggest that care quality in nursing homes may 
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continue to erode as the market for alternative, community-based long-term care services 
expands. 
The second study examines the Medicare regulation effects on nursing home 
quality controlling for the whole long-term care market competition structure. In many 
local markets nursing homes now compete with assisted living facilities for residents, yet 
most previous studies of the effects of Medicaid nursing home reimbursement policies on 
care quality have analyzed nursing homes in isolation, ignoring the presence of nearby 
competitor firms, and how state regulation of assisted living facilities might also affect 
care quality in nursing homes.  This study uses a richer model specification that accounts 
for a much broader range of state long-term care regulations as well as the structure of a 
nursing home’s local market.  Findings reveal that a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate 
leads to significant improvements in nine different aspects of nursing home quality, while 
state certificate-of-need programs for nursing homes lead to a decline in several (but not 
all) dimensions of it.  A large presence of assisted living beds in a local market also tends 
to reduce nursing home quality, and state regulations regarding assisted living facilities 
indirectly affect nursing home care quality by altering the nature of local market 
competition.  Overall, these results suggest that state laws related to all long-term care 
providers, not just nursing homes, are important determinants of nursing home care 
quality. 
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